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The title of empire floats about the modern United States from time to time in a variety of 
political or social contexts, but in this current-day conversation, it is almost always in relation to 
the previous seven or so decades. The American imperialism debate was reinvigorated with the 
invasion of Iraq in early 2003, and sharp divisions appeared in public opinion.1 The topic is 
highly politicized and often avoided in public company; however, the discussion is far from new 
to American society.2 American social and political leaders have been discussing the virtues and 
implications of expansion, empire, and contingent concepts such as commerce and war since the 
earliest days of the Republic. The concept of expansion had been approached as a “when” 
subject, as opposed to an “if” subject, for decades by the time of the Revolution, as evidenced by 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763.3 This spirit of expansionism pervades American history. 
 At the dawn of 1835, the western edges of United States territory were the international 
borders between the U.S., Mexico, and the Oregon Country. That autumn, the Mexican province 
of Texas rebelled against the central government alongside several other provinces, and in the 
spring of 1836, Texas declared independence. The Republic of Texas established itself among 
the states of North America with victory at San Jacinto and sent a request for annexation to 
Washington; the request was declined. 
Annexation succeeded under a later attempt after a decade of independence, and a U.S. 
garrison entered Texas under General Taylor. Four days after Christmas 1845, Texas received 
full statehood in the American Union despite still being claimed as a province by the Centralist 
Mexican Republic.4 On its own, the annexation of Texas to the American Union did not ignite 
                                                          
1 Dane Kennedy. “Essay and Reflection: On the American Empire from a British Imperial Perspective” The 
International History Review 29, no. 1 (March 2007), 83 
2 Alfred W. McCoy, Francisco A. Scarano, “On the Tropic of Cancer: Transitions and Transformations in the U.S. 
Imperial State,” Colonial crucible: empire in the making of the modern American state, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and 
Francisco A. Scarano, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 8.  
3 The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams, (New York: Antiquarian Press, 1960), 3:225 
4 “President’s Message,” Milwaukie Daily Sentinel (Milwaukie, WI), Dec 12, 1845 
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the Mexican-American War. This aggressive act of expansion likely would have started a war if 
Mexico had been in a stronger position relative to the United States, but the reality of the day in 
Mexico was debilitating debt and civil disorder. The United States was requesting diplomatic 
resolutions, and in no position to defend her claims to Texas militarily, Mexico began the 
process of reopening diplomacy.5 Following a military coup d’état, the restoration of diplomacy 
ended, and U.S. forces were sent into disputed border territory. 
General Taylor’s forces moved down the Texan coast, and they approached the Rio 
Grande near Matamoros with explicit orders to abstain hostility unless attacked.6 They encamped 
in an elevated position there, built breastworks around the camp, and placed artillery overlooking 
the river and city.7 In the following days, a cavalry skirmish left Americans dead on the river’s 
north bank.8 A defensive war was declared by the United States, and offensive campaigns deep 
into undisputed Mexican territory were soon underway. This was a thinly veiled act of 
aggression, and it constituted an act of imperialism. 
 
Defining Empire and Imperialism 
 The moniker “empire” describes an impressively diverse group of states across the 
majority of civilized history. With that in mind, it is unsurprising that the characteristics of each 
application of the term are also diverse. Defining an empire is therefore a less simple task than 
one would initially presume. Merriam-Webster defines empire as “a major political unit having a 
territory of great extent or a number of territories or peoples under a single sovereign authority.”9 
                                                          
5 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. (1885. Reprint, Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952. 
Reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1982), 23 
6The Works of James Buchanan, ed. John Bassett Moore, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1909), 6:481 
7 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 30 
8 The Works of James Buchanan, 6:481 
9 "Imperialism." Merriam-Webster.com, Accessed April 29, 2016. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/imperialism. 
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In his Journal of Contemporary History article “Where Does the World Historian Write From?” 
Richard Drayton elaborates on this definition significantly: 
 
Imperialism, in all its contexts, is a regime through which external entities derive 
maximum gain from the labour and resources within a territory. A foreign power, with or 
without formal colonization, although always with local collaborators, secures a protected 
and privileged sphere for its economic actors. There the relationship of labour to capital 
is manipulated via the suppression of taxes, wages, social or environmental protections, 
by forms of coercion which drive labour towards that direction of employment and limit 
its legal or practical ability to resist the regime, and from which tribute, commodities and 
profit may be freely expatriated.10 
 
In the traditional sense, an empire is a sovereign entity which expands territorially via 
direct annexation, colonial subjugation, or compelling weaker states to accept the larger state as 
their suzerain. In addition to traditional imperialism, there is the concept of informal imperialism. 
Informal imperialism holds that any sufficiently powerful state that projects influence of a social, 
cultural, or economic kind is also an empire, even if it does not gain political control over the 
influenced states.11 The common theme between traditional, formal empires and informal 
empires is actionable relative power balances wherein a powerful state plunders or subjugates a 
weaker state.12 The methods, goals, and results of such interactions begin to diverge so rapidly 




                                                          
10 Richard Drayton. "Where Does the World Historian Write From? Objectivity, Moral Conscience and the Past and 
Present of Imperialism." Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 3 (2011): 680-681 
11 McCoy, Scarano, “On the Tropic of Cancer,” 4 
12 Frank Ninkovich, “The United States and Imperialism,” A Companion to American Foreign Relations, ed. Robert 
Schulzinger, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 79-80 
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Existing Arguments on Empire and the United States 
Whether the thus-defined term applies to the United States is, as already mentioned, an 
active debate. Frank Ninkovich has said that it “is undeniable that the United States was an 
imperial power,” and the important question is, rather than whether the U.S. was imperial, 
whether the “US continue[d] on an imperialistic course even after it had abandoned its colonial 
possessions.”13 In response to this question he presents two primary schools of thought, historical 
continuity and aberration. Both are established on the recognition that imperialism reared its 
head with the Spanish-American War and subsequent acquisition of Spanish colonies in the 
Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean; the disagreement between them lies in the interpretation of 
these events and their causes. If the individual making an interpretation sees the 1890s as the 
maintenance of already-present patterns in American history, that individual belongs to the 
historical continuity school, and he or she likely views “imperialism [as] a central theme of US 
foreign relations.”14 If the analyst considers expansion during 1890s distinct from other instances 
of expansion for any reason, they belong to the aberration camp, and they “likely see imperialism 
as only one element, albeit an important one, of broader national and international processes.”15 
In “From Old Empire to New,” a chapter in Colonial Crucible, an edited collection of 
essays on empire and America, Thomas McCormick presents an unbalanced example of both the 
continuity and the aberration arguments. McCormick opens with his understanding of the “Great 
Aberration” viewpoint, and he makes no secret of his conviction that it is a myth rooted in 
national exceptionalism, cognitive dissonance, and national self-image preservation. He argues 
that imperialism is an inherent aspect of the United States and has been present from the 
                                                          
13 Ninkovich, “The United States and Imperialism,” 80-81 
14 Ninkovich, “The United States and Imperialism,” 81 
15 Ibid. 84 
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Republic’s earliest days. He divides American history into a First and Second American Empire, 
and he separates them with the transition from continental expansion to overseas expansion.16 
Not only does this argument hold that imperialism was inherent and present from the Nation’s 
inception, it considers the intensity of this imperial character to be of an extreme degree. 
McCormick agrees with this paper’s argument that the annexation of the American Southwest 
was imperial, but he goes even further, arguing that those portions of Mexico not annexed 
remained under Mexican sovereignty merely because the requirements of administering an 
empire of that size outmatched the resources then at the country’s disposal. Following the 
nineteenth century consolidation of the modern-day contiguous 48 states, the First American 
Empire transitions into the Second, and the country’s imperial ambitions shifted south and west 
to the Caribbean and Pacific. 
In the first chapter of the collection in which McCormick’s article appears, Colonial 
Crucible, the authors Alfred McCoy, Francisco Scarano, and Courtney Johnson lay out the 
central positions collectively argued by the various essays when read in tandem, after which they 
segue into a thorough history of twentieth-century scholarship on imperialism in American 
policy and actions. Their thesis is that American colonialism was a profound actor in shaping 
modern American statecraft, and that both the American imperial methodology and those on the 
receiving end of imperial actions played equally important roles in this capacity. This essay 
presents a well-balanced view of American imperialism that fits into both camps described by 
Ninkovich. While imperialism is seen as a central theme in American history, “direct colonial 
rule … represented something of an aberration within a distinctively indirect American 
                                                          
16 Thomas McCormick, “From Old Empire to New: The Changing Dynamics and Tactics of American Empire,” 
Colonial crucible: empire in the making of the modern American state, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. 
Scarano, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 64-66 
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hegemony.”17 Similar to McCormick’s article, this chapter also recognizes an imperial typology 
categorizing empires as continental or maritime and typical administrative approaches within 
each. 
Dane Kennedy also argues in favor of the existence of an American Empire, and he 
spends far more time elucidating informal empire both as a term and as it applies to the United 
States. Little in his article, “On the American Empire from a British Imperial Perspective,” 
directly addresses the events that formulate the scope of this paper, but he does provide a 
detailed look into specific behaviors characteristic of empires or imperial ambitions. Foremost 
among these is the willingness to utilize military power at will, unilaterally, and unprovoked. 
Secondary to this are exerting overwhelming economic influence as both producer and 
consumer, providing foreign aid substantial enough to force regimes into a state of dependence, 
using covert operations to overthrow otherwise nonaggressive regimes that happen to block state 
interests, compelling states to accede to U.S. interests via gunboat diplomacy, and occupying 
land in foreign states on which military bases, prisons, and American-owned business assets are 
operated. He also discusses the characteristics of the culture and ideology of imperialism; the 
most generally applicable aspect of which is the civilizing mission, or, as applied to the British 
and American examples, Rudyard Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden.” He agrees with 
McCormick regarding the United States having been different kinds of empires at different 
points in its imperial history, but he does not distinguish between successive empires.18  
 Of the arguments discussed thus far, most focused on the late nineteenth century through 
the mid-twentieth. The question to be asked now is whether the behaviors and actions established 
above as imperial in nature can be observed during the early nineteenth century, specifically the 
                                                          
17 McCoy, Scarano, “On the Tropic of Cancer,” 5 
18 Kennedy, “Essay and Reflection,” 108 
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period from 1803 to 1848. To address this question, this paper will organize the qualities used as 
imperial diagnostics on the post-1898 United States into distinct themes and examine each 
through the lens of Mexican-American relations. The categories of unilateral military 
provocation, imposing state interests on foreign powers through either influence or military 
strength using relative power advantages, actively seeking to increase the resources and 
territories without regard for foreign sovereignty, and the role – if any – played by racism in 
justifying expansion all come directly from the previously mentioned scholars, but the final 
category – examining the state’s goals in comparison to the state’s actual gains and whether the 
interim events were deliberate strategy or simple happenstance – is not discussed in depth by any 
of the articles referenced above. This final category’s contents are not required to conclude a 
state’s imperial status, and in fact they are traditionally incorporated in arguments against post-
1898 imperialism. However, it is nearly untouched in relation to pre-1898 arguments, and 




Mexican-American diplomatic relations soured over the American annexation of Texas, 
but this was not the direct cause of the war of 1846-1848 between them. Despite explicit claims 
otherwise, the friendship between the two states was not founded on the principle of shared 
republicanism; rather, the American stance on Mexico was the product of an American agenda 
relative to an intercontinental, interimperial competition. Initial refusal to recognize Mexican 
independence was in response to American relations with the Spanish Empire and ongoing 
negotiations on a treaty between Madrid and Washington. When it came, recognition was a 
7
Welk: Texas, War, and Empire
Published by Purdue e-Pubs, 2017
Texas, War, and Empire  Jon Welk 
8 
 
means of protecting an American sphere of influence under the guise of an anti-imperial policy 
in the North American continent. When relations soured, it was because the U.S. had pursued 
territorial growth via Texas despite conflicting, variably-valid claims held by Mexico, the 
Republic of Texas, and the United States. War came to the American Southwest not because 
Texas joined the Union, but because Texas alone did not sate the United States’ territorial 
appetite. This war was not inevitable, and it was not a defensive war. Because each point in the 
evolution of Mexican-American relations was shaped by American goals of either expanding 
their own power or territory or reducing that of European empires, the entire evolutionary 
process from recognition to war collectively illustrates the imperial character of the United States 
in the first half of the nineteenth century. The eventual war being neither defensive nor inevitable 
support that diagnosis of imperialism, and the results of reapplying the discussed arguments by 
other scholars regarding American imperialism are consistent with this conclusion. 
The centermost points in the above thesis are the Mexican-American War not being a 
direct result of annexing Texas, the War not being inevitable, and the eventual outbreak of 
conflict being the result of a popular imperial agenda rather than either the annexation of Texas 
or the deceitful tactics of James K. Polk. All three are uncommonly argued, and each point 
challenges established arguments. Few works indeed address whether the war with Mexico was 
inevitable, but most passively treat war as a necessary outcome of annexing Texas. A modest 
number more argue that war became inevitable following Texas’ addition to the Union, 
effectively arguing simultaneously that the war was both inevitable at that point and directly 
caused by annexation. T.J. Stiles briefly mentions Texas and the Mexican-American War in 
passing in his Jesse James biography, arguing that the “absorption of Texas virtually guaranteed 
8
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war with Mexico, which had never accepted the independence of its rebellious province.”19  In 
his article on General Kearney, Anthony Brandt mentions in the first paragraph that “no one 
doubts [Polk] deliberately manufactured” the instigation to war, but he provides no citation for 
this claim.20  
The imperial agenda upon which this paper places war-guilt refers generally, in this 
context, to the unqualified desire for Mexican lands stretching many hundreds of miles further 
west and north than the full extent of territory claimed by Texas. While this fact of history is 
occasionally acknowledged in direct correlation to the pre-war events surrounding Texas, it is 
rarely explored except as Manifest Destiny or simply expansionism. The popular alternate cause 
of war is slavery, and the slaves of American settlers in Texas and the Mexican government’s 
anti-slavery stance is an often-mentioned source of conflict that resulted in Texan independence. 
The slavery argument’s primary point, however, is the escalating passions and discord 
surrounding the balance of free states to slave states, and the geographic location of Texas would 
designate it, if it was welcomed into the Union, a slave state as per the Missouri Compromise. 
 
The Birth of Conflict 
 The seeds of conflict that would grow into the tense fourth and fifth decades of the 
nineteenth century were planted in 1803 with the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from 
France. Prior to this, the western and southern U.S. borders were the Mississippi River and the 
north edge of Spanish Florida. Where French Louisiana ended and New Spain began was a 
matter of dispute, and the extent of the lands included in the Louisiana Purchase was defined as 
                                                          
19 T.J. Stiles, Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War, (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 21-22 
20 Anthony Brandt, “General Kearney’s California Trek, 1846: How the father of the U.S. Cavalry won the West 
with an all-but-bloodless war,” Military History Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Autumn 2016): 54 
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“fully and in the same manner as it had been acquired by France from Spain, in virtue of the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso, … with the same extent that it then had in the hands of Spain and that it 
had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered 
into between Spain and other states.” 21 The extent Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin’s above 
1810 quote refers to is finally defined in detail in the “grant of Louis XIV, to Crozat, dated 14th 
September, 1712,” and Gallatin summarizes its contents as “all the country drained by the waters 
emptying directly or indirectly into the Mississippi is included within the boundaries of 
Louisiana.”22 Gallatin goes on to establish the American 1803 claim to lands beyond the modern-
day Louisiana-Texas state line: 
 
The discovery of that river [Mississippi] by the French, and the general principles 
adopted by the European nations in relation to the rights of discovery, the publicity of the 
grant, and the long acquiescence of Spain, establish the claim of the United States to that 
extent. But the western boundary on the sea-shore, and south of the waters emptying into 
the Red River, is still a subject of controversy between the two nations; the territory 
called by Spain ‘Province of Texas’ being claimed by both. The claim of France, now 
transferred to the United States, extended at least as far west as the bay of St. Bernard 
[Espiritu Santo Bay], in virtue of the settlement made there by La Salle, in 1685, in the 
vicinity of the river Guadeloupe, at a time when Spain occupied no part of the territory 
east of the Rio Norte [Rio Grande]. That settlement was destroyed, and, notwithstanding 
the repeated orders of the French government, was not resumed by the local authorities. 
In the mean while (in 1717), the Spaniards sent some priests among the Indians, and 
shortly after established a small military post at Adayes, afterwards transferred to 
Nogodoches, on which rests their claim to the country east of La Salle’s settlement.23 
 
 He then shifted to territorial disputes to the east and south of the Louisiana Territory 
regarding the border between Louisiana and Spanish Florida. At the Seven Years’ War’s 
conclusion, France ceded that fraction of Louisiana east of the Mississippi to England by the 
1763 Treaty of Paris and the remainder of Louisiana to Spain by a separate treaty in 1762. Spain 
                                                          
21 The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3:211 
22 Ibid. 3:211 
23 The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3:211 
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ceded colonial Florida to England by the same treaty, and the two separate English acquisitions 
were named East and West Florida. The most important distinction comes at the end of the 
American Revolution; Gallatin informs his reader, “by the treaties of 1783, Great Britain ceded 
to the United States all that part of the former colony of Louisiana east of the Mississippi which 
lay north of the 31st degree of north latitude, and to Spain, under the name of West and East 
Florida, both that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi which lay south of that parallel of 
latitude, and the old Spanish province of Florida.”24 Therefore, because Spain briefly held the 
entire territory of Louisiana prior to “Louisiana [being] retroceded to France ‘with the same 
extent that it then had in the hands of Spain,’” and “the territory in question, by whatever name 
Spain chose to call it, was then substantially in her hands,” that retrocession provided France 
with title to the portion of Louisiana since renamed West Florida, and subsequently, “The title of 
the United States to the territory in question [West Florida]… is fully established.”25 
These disputes over the international border between the United States and New Spain 
destabilized U.S.-Spanish relations and increasingly cultivated feelings of antagonism and 
hostility. By 1816, mounting tensions began approaching levels sufficient to introduce legitimate 
worries over a coming war, and by 1817, they had escalated to the point of it being an imminent 
threat.26 The United States was determined to have the whole of Florida, and on the basis of the 
tenuous claim from the Louisiana Purchase, Congress authorized the seizure of half of West 
Florida in 1810.27 In January of 1811, that authorization was expanded to allow the deployment 
of federal troops to the remainder of West Florida if it was in danger of falling into the hands of 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 3:212 
25 Ibid. 3:212-213 
26 The Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington C. Ford, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), 
6:22, 142 
27 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, (New York: R. Worthington, 1884) 2:488 
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any power other than Spain or the United States, including newly declared independent 
republics.28 Across the Mississippi, Spain had settlers building a town on Galveston Island, and 
the U.S. protested that the settlement was on American land.29 
 Word reached Washington that Seminole raids into the American Deep South were 
originating from a location within Spanish Florida, and that the offending tribes were being 
allowed to reside there without penalty. Spain was obligated by treaty to “not suffer her Indians 
to attack the citizens of the United States,” but Spanish forces in Florida had refused to act when 
called upon by the U.S..30 Eventually Andrew Jackson was sent with a detachment of men, and 
there he engaged the Seminole in combat and occupied the Spanish city of Pensacola and Fort 
Saint Marks. Jackson refused to return either to Spanish possession until certain conditions were 
met.31 At nearly the same time, John Quincy Adams found a 1720 map of Louisiana clearly 
depicting the border as the Rio Grande, and tensions on both sides of the Mississippi successfully 
escalated further.32 
The United States had just recently ended a war, and the Spanish were facing armed 
rebellions in New Spain. A Spanish-American War in 1818 was not in the interests of either 
power. Seeking to avoid that culmination of these events and to resolve the border disputes, the 
two nations entered negotiations for a treaty to these ends. After repeated delays and new 
developments in the border controversy, the American and Spanish representatives, John Quincy 
Adams and Luis Onis, finally reached acceptable terms. Following additional delays, an 
international scandal, and more requested concessions from Spain, the terms were passed into 
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law as the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, and war between Spain and America was delayed by 75 
years.  
The treaty’s conditions stipulated specific territorial exchanges and relinquishments, and 
the U.S. was to accept $5M in indemnities due to Spain. The entirety of both East and West 
Florida passed to the United States, and Spain officially renounced their claim to the Oregon 
Country. In return, and in addition to the $5M debt, the U.S. renounced their claim to Texas 
beyond the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas Rivers.33 
 In a report back to Washington by the American minister in Madrid, the cause of some of 
the negotiation delays was revealed to be Spanish anxiety that the United States would offer 
formal recognition to the rebellious provinces of New Spain as soon as the treaty was concluded. 
In a twist of fate, it was, in fact, Spain who recognized Mexican independence first. By the same 
letter, the American Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, also learned that the Spanish 
cabinet was considering requiring an American pledge to abstain formal recognition of their 
American provinces before Spain would ratify the 1819 treaty.34 The American minister in 
Madrid was told in no uncertain terms that such a pledge would not be forthcoming, and Spain 
had already been informed of this. It was also made clear that, while the United States considered 
itself legitimately entitled to the treaty’s terms, the U.S. would not seize East Florida under arms. 
The controversial behavior of the Spanish government was seen in a bad light throughout 
Europe, and the Post-Napoleonic institutions of Europe were designed specifically to prevent the 
outbreak of war. Patience, in spite of insults, would yield the same results as violence but 
without nearly as high the cost of violence.35 In the event of violence, Spain’s unpopularity 
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would provide advantages to the already advantageous local position held by the United States in 
the relevant territories, but any preemptive military seizure of East Florida could rapidly reverse 
these advantages to Spain’s favor. All John Quincy Adams had to do was wait; Spain was 
cornered as long as the U.S. behaved itself militarily. 
 
 Mexican Independence, Rebellions, and Texan Independence 
 Spain ratified the treaty in 1820, and the United States Senate followed suit in 1821.36 
Recognition of independence was extended to Mexico via officials of each government in the 
year following their respective ratification of the Adams-Onis Treaty. Mexico soon assented to 
the border agreed upon within the treaty.37 Within the United States, however, contentment with 
that border was shrinking, and many there felt that the willful abandonment of the full territory 
of Texas to the Rio Grande was a mistake.38 Furthermore, the Spanish government in Madrid 
would soon rescind Spanish recognition of Mexican sovereignty and attempt to reconquer the 
colony for several years. 
 Meanwhile, Mexico was considering opening their borders to foreign settlers in a bid to 
shore up the population and development in lightly populated areas, and the revolutionary first 
government of Mexico instituted the empresario program for this purpose. The program invited 
foreigners to these vacant or nearly vacant spaces in their northern provinces, including Texas. In 
return, settlers were required to promise to develop the region they settled and assist the 
government in its struggle against the Native Americans there.39 Stephen Austin settled along the 
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Rio Brazos with 300 families under this program, and by 1827, roughly 1,800 Americans were 
living in Mexican Texas.40 
 The young Mexican state was troubled, and experienced relatively frequent shifts in 
government. The First Mexican Republic replaced the First Mexican Empire following 
declarations of independence from several imperial Mexican provinces and the abdication of the 
first emperor. The First Republic was a federal system comprised of voluntary constituent states 
that nominally retained individual sovereignty, but the right of secession was not established.41 
In 1834, President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna dissolved the First Republic’s national 
congress and set about forming a new, centralized government. At the end of 1835 he suspended 
the Mexican constitution, and a new constitution of his design was installed in its place. Santa 
Anna was making himself dictator of Mexico, and it sparked more armed rebellion throughout 
many Mexican states.  
Santa Anna was brutal in his suppression of the various rebellions, but the fires of civil 
war continued to spread. They reached Texas in 1835, and the following year the state broke off 
from Coahuila and the rest of Mexico by declaring itself an independent republic. Coahuila 
would also declare independence alongside Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon as the Republic of the 
Rio Grande. Over the course of the next decade, rebellions continued to flare up in Zacatecas, 
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, Yucatan, Sinaloa, New Mexico, Durango, 
California, Tampico, Querétaro, and Michoacán, and two more independent republics were 
declared in Yucatan and California.42 Only Texas found victory on the battlefield, and only 
Texas retained its independence. 
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 The Mexican Republic was wracked with debt and instability as multiple internal factions 
fought each other and regional rebellions erupted throughout the country. In the years 
immediately following the Texan revolution, news arrived in the U.S. of a second “successful 
revolutionary movement.”43 The debt of Mexico would not find an easy resolution, and it would 
remain a problem throughout the coming years.44 Mexico found itself in a dangerous position of 
weakness while holding vast territory and resources. 
The internal struggle for power in Mexico provided foreign empires and domestic 
provincial entities the ability to exercise their own agendas on the weakened state. Mexico owed 
money to Great Britain, France and the United States, had resident civilians from the United 
States and France living within its territory, and faced numerous armed nationalist uprisings all 
at the same time.45 The rebellion in Texas began in 1835 and resulted in the establishment of the 
Republic of Texas in 1836. Texas applied for admission into the United States the following 
August, but it was denied in the interests of international foreign relations and internal domestic 
controversy.46 The independence of Texas was not recognized by Mexico, and the annexation of 
Texas would have been viewed as hyper-aggressive expansionism by a country which already 
threatened leading global powers of the day. Mexico insisted that Texas was sovereign Mexican 
territory in rebellion, and made good on its insistence by maintaining a formal state of war with 
Texas from 1835 until the end of the Mexican-American War in early 1848. Even more 
important than that, the annexation of Texas could have added up to five new states with slavery 
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to the Union, giving the Civil War-South an extreme political advantage over the North in 
Washington.  
The independent Republic of Texas was recognized as a sovereign state by the U.S. in 
March of 1837, an “example soon followed by England, France, Holland, and Belgium.”47 
President Tyler then reopened the annexation talks with the government of Texas in 1844 as his 
administrative term’s end drew near. He completed a treaty of annexation before leaving office 
in 1844, but it failed ratification in the Senate. The job was inherited by President Polk in 1845.48 
The object of acquiring Texas was far from new when President Tyler restarted 
annexation negotiations in 1844. In a speech to the Senate on the issue of annexing Texas, 
Secretary of State Buchanan noted that “Messrs. [Quincy] Adams and Clay made two 
unsuccessful efforts, in 1825 and 1827, to purchase Texas from Mexico, whilst actual war-not a 
mere paper war-was raging between Spain and Mexico, and long before the government of Spain 
had recognized the independence of Mexico.”49 He then discussed a third attempt that was made 
in 1829 by General Jackson and Martin van Buren despite the fact that Spain was in the middle 
of “a last and desperate struggle to recover Mexico.” In addition to revealing that the U.S. had 
long been interested in southwestern territorial expansion, these comments further addressed 
arguments being made for and against annexation in 1844. A treaty had been signed 
acknowledging Texan independence following Houston’s victory at San Jacinto in 1836, but this 
treaty was signed by General Santa Anna while being held prisoner in Texas. After signing the 
treaty, he and his army were permitted to return to Mexico in peace. There, he disavowed the 
treaty’s validity, but Buchanan and General Jackson claimed Santa Anna had “repeatedly” 
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recognized “the folly” of continuing to claim Texas as Mexican. 50 Ulysses S Grant discussed 
this same treaty in his memoirs, and he asserted its invalidity because it was signed under 
duress.51 Buchanan’s pro-annexation argument rested on notions of honor, but honor does not 
remove the hue of aggression from annexing territory not recognized as independent. 
Mexico insisted the 1836 treaty was invalid all the way up through the end of the 
Mexican-American War, after which it became a practically moot point. A state of war between 
Texas and Mexico was maintained officially until the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 at 
the closure of the Mexican-American War, but hostile contact and combat engagements were 
scarce following San Jacinto in 1836. Secretary Buchanan said that “no serious attempt” had 
been made by Mexico to reconquer Texas since 1836, but he later clarified that he had excluded 
Mexican expeditions into Texas under General Woll in 1842 because they were brief and half-
hearted.52 In 1842, Secretary of State Daniel Webster stated that, “no hostile foot [found] rest 
within her [Texas] soil for six or seven years, and Mexico herself [refrained] for all that period 
from any further attempt to re-establish her own authority over that territory.”53 Albert Gallatin 
wrote in Peace with Mexico that Texans had not entered Mexico for military purposes since 
1842.54 
The issue of annexation was so popular among the American public that it would be 
central to the 1844 election, and it was so important to the election that Martin van Buren’s 
presidential candidacy was cast in doubt following his public anti-annexation stance.55 It was 
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amid this concoction of international relations, national interests, potential for personal political 
gains, and widespread public opinion that President Tyler reached out to Texas in 1844. 
 
Imperialism and Economy in the Case of Texas 
The British Empire had long been interested in the relationships between the United 
States and both Spain and Mexico. During the dangerously high tensions preceding the Adams-
Onis Treaty, the British advanced an offer of mediation between Washington and Madrid, but 
knowing the Americans would not want British interests represented in negotiations, the offer 
was only presented to Spain at first.56 It was speculated that this was because Spain had 
previously sworn to never cede Florida to the U.S., but they had changed their minds in the years 
leading up to 1819.57  
The British Foreign Office and American State Department were locked in competition 
over Mexico’s favor from that country’s first day of independence onwards, and the British were 
ahead.58 When resolutions for annexation passed Congress, Great Britain, France, and Holland 
lodged formal protests that the United States was in contravention of an international treaty, and 
Great Britain and France worked closely together to defeat annexation from start to finish despite 
French promises not to oppose U.S. efforts there.59 Once Texas had asserted its independence at 
the Battle of San Jacinto, the British competition for influence at once expanded to the new 
Republic. The same European powers, Great Britain, France, and Holland, were as quick to 
recognize Texas as the United States was. Alongside extending recognition, England also offered 
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the service of mediating a treaty between Texas and Mexico that would grant Texas official 
Mexican recognition of their sovereignty, and when France and the U.S. proposed to join 
England and make a joint effort in this endeavor, England refused. Making note of that refusal, 
Secretary Buchanan remarked on the political gains of accomplishing such a feat single-handedly 
relative to sharing success with two other countries, and he warned, “England is using every 
effort of skilful [sic] diplomacy to acquire an influence in Texas, to be used notoriously to our 
prejudice…hereafter which might render annexation impossible.”60  
The interest of the European empires in Texas was largely economic, but there were 
degrees of simple asset denial and anti-slavery involved as well. Despite its young age, the 
American Republic had grown explosively in both land and population by 1845. The U.S. was 
lightly industrialized compared to Great Britain, and American industrialization was primarily 
found in the Civil War North until the second half of the century. This meant that while U.S. 
manufacturing was on the rise, the dominant producer of manufactured goods remained the 
British Empire. Naturally, producing high volumes of manufactured goods is only profitable if 
one has access to the appropriate markets. In the 19th century world, protective tariffs remained 
ever-present, meaning that an economy with comparatively high production capacity could only 
remain profitable if adequately supplied with raw resources and unindustrialized territory in need 
of their products. Empire provided both these requirements to the imperial homeland.  
Into the above equation, enter the valuable and none-too-easily produced resource of raw 
cotton. The cultivation of cotton is labor-intensive, the crop depletes soil nutrients, and it only 
grows in specific biomes. Despite extensive European efforts to establish or expand other cotton 
supplies, these factors culminated in a 19th century global American monopoly on the production 
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of quality and affordable raw cotton.61 The importance of this monopoly is made clear by its 
juxtaposition to the contemporary British industrial economy, the chief export of which was 
textiles. Remarking on this relationship, Secretary Buchanan noted, “cotton manufacture is 
necessary not merely to the prosperity but almost to the very existence of England.” The result 
was Great Britain being “dependent upon the nation which holds in its hands the raw material of 
this manufacture. Such is our position towards her at the present moment.”62  
At this point Texas entered the global stage. Texas was massive in size and its economy 
was unindustrialized, but most importantly, it was home to “a soil and climate better adapted for 
the cultivation of cotton than any other region on the face of the earth.” In addition to this, Texas 
contained abundant farmland capable of producing significant crops of “all the agricultural 
staples of the middle and western States.”63 While every international empire stood to make 
substantial gains by insuring the Texan Republic remained independent of the United States, 
Great Britain was in position to gain the most of all, and regardless of which European power 
gained most, in such a scenario the United States would be facing new substantial economic 
competition and relative power loss. The American annexation of Texas would maintain the U.S. 
monopoly on cotton, provide a large, domestic demand for manufactured goods, and deny both 
an alternate agricultural supply and a new, high-demand manufactured goods market to Europe. 
Failure to annex Texas would result in the end of the U.S. cotton monopoly, the denial of a new 
market for American industry, the introduction of a new major competitor in agriculture, and the 
opening of new markets for British, French, and any other industrialized European power’s 
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manufactories. With the United States continuously growing in size, wealth and strength, 
blocking annexation was a major goal for America’s imperial competitors. 
 
Spies in Texas 
In view of these high stakes that took shape over the future of Texas with a lively 
competition already longstanding between England and the U.S., it is unsurprising that every 
practical measure to better ensure the success of annexation was taken by the American 
government. To this end, the State Department dispatched Charles Wickliffe to the Texan capital 
city, Austin. In the letter detailing his assignment from the State Department, Wickliffe was 
forewarned, “Great Britain and France are exerting themselves in concert through their public 
ministers in Texas, to defeat the reünion [sic] of that Republic with the United States,” thus 
making it, “expedient to employ a confidential agent for the purpose of counteracting their 
efforts.” His first task was to contact the official American government representative and 
Charge d’affaires in Texas, A.J. Donelson, but his “official character” and purpose in Texas was 
to be kept strictly secret.64 The President’s instructions, relayed through the Secretary of State to 
Wickliffe, revealed that the Polk administration was willing to go great lengths for the 
annexation of Texas: 
 
You will perceive from the first of the joint resolutions, “annexing Texas to the United 
States,” that the consent of the existing Government is a pre-requisite to the election of 
deputies to form a Constitution. To obtain this consent may possibly be found the greatest 
obstacle in the way to annexation. As this very question must now be under the 
consideration of the authorities of Texas, the necessity is urgent for your presence at their 
seat of Government as soon as practical. […] You are fully acquainted with the nature 
and progress of this great question, in all its bearings, from the beginning; and you will 
use such arguments on the proper occasions and to the proper persons, as you may deem 
best adapted to convince the authorities and people of Texas that their reünion [sic] with 
the United States will promote and secure their own best interests and those of their 
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posterity.  Under the broad banner of the Union, they will be relieved from foreign 
influence, which now threatens to distract and divide them, and which has ever proved 
the bane of all Republics within its reach; -their peculiar institutions will be protected 
against the attacks of the English and French fanatics; the emigration of their brethren 
from the United States will be largely increased; the value of their property be greatly 
enhanced, and the blessings of liberty and free government will be permanently secured 
to them by a powerful Confederacy, which will be rendered still more powerful by the 
accession of Texas. Instead of mutual jealousies, which will be fomented by the policy of 
foreign governments and which may result in mutual hostility and lasting injury to both, 
the sister Republics in union will proceed on a career of prosperity such as the world has 
never witnessed. If some of the conditions proposed in the second joint resolution for 
annexation may seem unreasonable, there can be no doubt but that prompt justice will be 
done to Texas in a liberal spirit after she shall have been restored to the family of her 
sisters. These and similar topics which will readily suggest themselves to your 
experienced and well informed mind, you will not fail to press upon all suitable 
occasions, knowing that the United States have nothing to oppose to the machinations 
and influence of Great Britain and France except arguments founded on truth and 
justice.65 
 
The skill of Secretary Buchanan in phrasing things written in his official capacity as head 
of the State Department as innocuously as possible was certainly impressive, but these 
instructions to Mr. Wickliffe revealed an expansionist strategy was in action at the White House 
that appeared to consider nothing off the table in the pursuit of Texas. His task was to directly 
influence the “authorities and people of Texas” and convince them that joining the American 
Union was the best way to protect their interests. Among the list of the claimed benefits for 
Texas, the Secretary of State, bearing the words of the President, suggested that, if they did not 
pass the annexation resolutions, foreign influence, “the bane of all Republics,” would divide and 
weaken them, their slaves would be taken from them, their considerably larger and more 
powerful northern neighbor, the United States, would become jealous of them, and they may find 
themselves in a hostile conflict with the U.S. resulting in “lasting injuries.”66 
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The “annex now, details later” sentiment was an approach Secretary Buchanan reflected 
often in his writings. Not least of all the things unveiled in this letter, the simple act of sending 
an undercover agent to a friendly country and prospective member of the Union for the purpose 
of asserting American interests above their own was a troubling act of empire and a debasement 
of the principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty. Each of these points was, of 
course, conveyed as harmlessly and amicably as possible by one with great talent in that regard, 
but the message to be conveyed remained urgent, ominous, and suggestive of a willingness to 
undermine legitimate democratic proceedings with covert propaganda to further the interests of 
the state. 
 
The Severance of Diplomacy 
General Almonte, the Minister of the Mexican Legation to Washington, penned a letter of 
protest addressed to both the Secretary of State John Calhoun and the President, John Tyler, 
dated March 10th, 1845, regarding the House of Representatives having voted on annexing Texas 
in the affirmative. He expressed regret at the “despoiling of a friendly nation” by “an act of 
aggression the most unjust of which can be found recorded in the annals of modern history…on 
the part of the American government.”67 Almonte further declared his mission in Washington 
terminated, and he demanded his passports. President Polk’s administration began that week, and 
it fell to James Buchanan, the new Secretary of State, to respond.  Buchanan deflected blame by 
stating that, having passed Congress and been signed by the Executive, the matter was then out 
of that government’s hands; stopping the admission of Texas to the Union could be 
accomplished by “nothing but the refusal of Texas to ratify the terms and conditions on which 
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her admission depends.” His letter to General Almonte finished with the soon-to-be ubiquitous 
sincere regrets, earnest hopes for future reconciliation, and cheerful declarations of upcoming 
“strenuous efforts…devoted to the amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint.”68 
Following the suspension of diplomacy between Mexico and the United States, the 
foremost goal of the American government was to restore diplomatic intercourse if possible 
while remaining “consistent with the national honor.”69 The Polk administration’s response to 
this situation was to send a spy to Mexico City, and W.S. Parrott was selected for the job. 
Forewarned that success would require the “perfect command of temper in all situations and 
under all circumstances, and [his] prudence in refraining from the least intimation that [he is] a 
Government agent, unless this should become indispensable to the success of [his] mission,” 
Parrott was reminded that his mission was “delicate and important in character and may involve 
the public peace.” From there the letter takes on the tone of a Cold War espionage story: 
 
You will proceed without delay by the most expeditious route to the City of Mexico, and 
will ascertain the temper and tone of the present Mexican Government towards the 
United States. Such previous knowledge is necessary to enable you to decide upon the 
manner of approaching the chief officers of that government. From the nature of the case, 
it is impossible to give you specific instructions as to your mode of proceeding. Nearly all 
must depend upon your own prudence and discretion. The great object of your mission 
and that which you will constantly keep in view in all your proceedings, is to reach the 
President and other high officers of the Mexican government and especially the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs; and by every honorable effort to convince them that it is the true 
interest of their country, as it certainly is, to restore friendly relations between the two 
Republics. Should you clearly ascertain that they are willing to renew our diplomatic 
intercourse, then and not till then you are liberty to communicate to them your official 
character and to state that the United States will send a Minister to Mexico as soon as 
they receive authentic information that he will be kindly received. The policy which the 
President will pursue towards Mexico is best illustrated by the following extract from my 
note to General Almonte under the date 10th instant, in answer to his note to Mr. Calhoun 
of the 6th, protesting against the Resolution of the late Congress for annexing Texas to the 
United States, and demanding his passports. […] Whilst, therefore, you ought not to 
conceal that the reünion [sic] of Texas with the United States is already decreed and can 
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never under any circumstances be abandoned, you are at liberty to state your confident 
belief that in regard to all unsettled questions, we are prepared to meet Mexico in a most 
liberal and friendly spirit. You will ascertain the nature and causes of the late revolution 
in Mexico, and whether the new Government will most probably be permanent, the 
character of the chiefs of that revolution, and what are their dispositions towards the 
United States and other foreign nations. […] If upon your arrival at Vera Cruz you should 
find that the government of Mexico have commenced open hostilities against the United 
States, you will return immediately. In that unfortunate event we shall be prepared to act 
promptly and vigorously in maintaining the rights and honor of the country.70 
 
 
This letter revealed that the U.S. was already prepared for and expecting the coming of a 
war with Mexico, and that all declarations of friendly desires and hopes for continued peace were 
simply matters of maintaining the most advantageous position possible in pursuing further state 
interests at the lowest cost possible. Another letter written the following day, March 29th, 1845, 
to Mr. Wilson Shannon, the head of the American Legation to Mexico, further illustrated the 
American position towards Mexico and the methods the U.S. was undertaking in regards to state 
interests relevant to Mexico: 
 
After a careful examination of your controversy with that Minister [Mr. Rejon, Mexican 
Minister of Foreign Affairs], he [President Polk] regrets that you have assumed the high 
responsibility of suspending all diplomatic intercourse with the Mexican Government 
without the previous authority of your own government. The President, whilst expressing 
this regret, is fully sensible of the provocation which you have received, and has no doubt 
of the purity and patriotism of the motives by which you were actuated. The relative 
position of the United States towards Mexico is best sustained by firmness of action 
accompanied by moderation of language. Power and true greatness such as belong to our 
country ought never to waste themselves in words towards a feeble and distracted sister 
Republic, no matter how much her minister may have scolded. It is probable that nothing 
could have been more agreeable to the Mexican Government than to learn from your note 
of the 8th of November, 1844, to Mr. Rejon, that unless his notes…should be withdrawn, 
all further official intercourse between you and the Government of Mexico would be 
suspended until you could hear from your own government. His prompt refusal to 
withdraw these notes has placed you in such a position that you have never since been 
able to press upon Mexico the numerous claims which we have upon her justice, 
independent of the Texan question. […] It is his [President Polk] purpose and desire to 
adjust all the other questions in dispute between the two Republics upon the most fair and 
liberal terms. […] Should Mexico commence hostilities against us, we shall be prepared 
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promptly and efficiently to maintain the interests and honor of the country, but nothing 
short of actual hostilities or the plunder and imprisonment of our own citizens will induce 
the President to depart from the tone and language of conciliation.71 
 
 
This letter to Mr. Shannon, more than any of the previously discussed letters, established 
the relative power between the United States and Mexico as heavily favoring the United States. 
Furthermore, it established the irredeemably racist paternalism exhibited toward Mexico and the 
realpolitik approach of the Polk administration. Once again, war was already on the table as a 
realistically possible contingency, and one which would be vigorously enacted if commenced. In 
this letter, as in the previous one to Mr. Parrott, insults and impugnation of American honor were 
fully anticipated on the part of the Mexico; however, Secretary Buchanan and President Polk 
advised their representatives that these words would merely be words, while the territory, 
resources, wealth and power gained by the United States in exchange for these insults were real, 
physically tangible, and lasting. This approach to Mexican-American relations was not the result 
of forward-thinking American politicians; it was the result of significant American advantages in 
wealth and power combined with a racist outlook on the Mexican people as inferior to white 
people. The statement, “power and true greatness such as belong to our country ought never to 
waste themselves in words towards a feeble and distracted sister Republic,” conclusively 
illustrated that, even if the United States did not actually occupy a position of such relative 
strength as to open the door to imperial policies, they surely viewed themselves as occupying 
such a position. While this cannot conclusively prove that the U.S. built an empire during these 
events, it certainly does show that imperial ambitions and preconditions were present in 1845.  
 With the annexation of the Texan Republic progressing through the national legislatures 
of both Texas and the United States, President Polk selected other targets as major goals of his 
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administration. Among the largest of his goals was the partition of the Oregon Country with the 
British Empire and the annexation of the portion consigned to the United States. Equally 
important to Polk’s administration was the acquisition of the California and New Mexico 
territories from Mexico. Although he preferred to accomplish all this peacefully, he was willing 
to push the issue as far as was required for success.72 
 
 New Opportunities pique Interest in California 
 When rebellion began to flare in California, the U.S. Department of State was made 
aware by letter from Thomas O. Larkin, the U.S. Consul in Monterey, California. In his reply, 
the Secretary of State James Buchanan noted that “we could take no part” in the conflict there, 
“unless [Mexico] should commence hostilities against the United States.” He further claimed, 
“This Government has no ambitious aspirations to gratify and no desire to extend our federal 
system over more territory than we already possess, unless by the free and spontaneous wish of 
the independent people of adjoining territories. The exercise of compulsion or improper 
influence to accomplish such a result, would be repugnant both to the policy and principles of 
this Government.”73 At best, this second statement would prove to be purposefully misguiding. 
In the same letter, dated October 17th, 1845, Secretary Buchanan further elaborated the official, 
public U.S. stance on California: 
 
But whilst these are the sentiments of the President, he could not view with indifference 
the transfer of California to Great Britain or any other European Power. The system of 
colonization by foreign monarchies on the North American continent must and will be 
resisted by the United States. It could result in nothing but evil to the colonists under their 
dominion who would naturally desire to secure for themselves the blessings of liberty by 
means of republican institutions; whilst it must prove highly prejudicial to the best 
interests of the United States. Nor would it in the end benefit such foreign monarchies. 
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On the contrary, even Great Britain, by the acquisition of California, would sow the seeds 
of future war and disaster for herself; because there is no political truth more certain than 
this fine Province could not long be held in vassalage by any European Power. The 
emigration to it of people from the United States would soon render this impossible. […] 
It appears that Mr. Rea, the Agent of the British Hudson Bay Company, furnished the 
Californians with arms and money in October and November, last, to enable them to 
expel the Mexicans from the country; and you state that this policy has been reversed, 
and now no doubt exists there, but that the Mexican troops about to invade the province 
have been sent for this purpose at the instigation of the British Government; and that ‘it is 
rumored that two English houses in Mexico have become bound to the new General to 
accept his drafts for funds to pay his troops for eighteen months.’ Connected with these 
circumstances, the appearance of a British Vice Consul and a French Consul in California 
at the present crises, without any apparent commercial business, is well calculated to 
produce the impression, that their respective governments entertain designs on that 
country which must necessarily be hostile to its interests. On all proper occasions, you 
should not fail prudently to warn the Government and people of California of the danger 
of such an interference to their peace and prosperity; to inspire them with a jealousy of 
European dominion, and to arouse in their bosoms that love of liberty and independence 
so natural to the American Continent. Whilst I repeat that this Government does not, 
under existing circumstances, intend to interfere between Mexico and California, it would 
vigorously interpose to prevent the latter from becoming a British or French Colony. […] 
Whilst the President will make no effort and use no influence to induce California to 
become one of the free and independent States of this Union, yet if the people should 
desire to unite their destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren.74 
  
The letter to the U.S. consul in California ended by adding the tasks of a spy to Mr. 
Larkin’s functions there. He was explicitly warned to “take care not to awaken the jealousy of 
the French and English agents there by assuming any other than your Consular character.” A 
second spy, Lt. Archibald H. Gillespie of the Marine Corps, was already en route to him in 
Monterey, and the two of them were tasked to provide intelligence on current events, the general 
disposition of Californians to the U.S., the Californian population numbers and their fieldable 
armies.75 They were to discern the “proportion of Mexican, American, British, and French 
citizens and the feelings of each class towards the United States, the names of and character of 
the principal persons in the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments of the Government 
                                                          
74 The Works of James Buchanan, 6:276-277 
75 Ibid. 6:277 
29
Welk: Texas, War, and Empire
Published by Purdue e-Pubs, 2017
Texas, War, and Empire  Jon Welk 
30 
 
and of other distinguished and influential citizens.” Beyond demographics, the two were told to 
report on California’s financial systems and resources, its commerce with other nations, its 
products that may be of use to the U.S., the products of the U.S. that are in demand there. 
Finally, they were also to discover where in California the “principal American settlements exist, 
the rate at which the settlers have been and still are increasing in number; - from what portions of 
the Union they come and by what routes they arrive.”76 
 While there is much that can be said in regard to the above letter, the importance of any 
such analysis increases substantially in light of a second letter sent by the Secretary on 
November 10th, 1845, to the U.S. minister in Mexico City, John Slidell. This second letter, even 
longer than the first, explains in excruciating detail the exact demands of the United States 
Slidell was to make in negotiations with the Mexican government over territorial disputes and 
international debts. 
 After detailing to John Slidell how to negotiate for the land claims of Texas, Secretary 
Buchanan turned the discussion to New Mexico. He maintained the façade of a hopeful friend, 
but that façade remained stiffly formal and vaguely threatening. The discussion’s transition from 
Texas began by acknowledging that, despite claiming half the territory of New Mexico due to the 
course of the Rio Grande, Texans had never possessed that area. He then noted that the Native 
Americans in the region were raiding settlements there and compelling Mexico to spend hefty 
resources in its defense, suggesting that these costs outweigh Mexico’s returns. Claiming it to be 
“greatly desired that our boundary with Mexico” would, following these negotiations, “be 
established in such a manner as to preclude all future difficulties and disputes,” Buchanan 
ominously suggested that, “should it remain a Mexican province,” it would “become a subject of 
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dispute … between those who, I trust, are destined in future to be always friends.”77 After 
reiterating the supposed Mexican benefits of ceding New Mexico to the United States, he went 
further by saying, “it would seem to be equally the interest of both Powers, that New Mexico 
should belong to the United States.”78  
Assuring Slidell that “the President desires to deal liberally by Mexico,” Buchanan then 
blatantly revealed Polk’s administration’s goal there by releasing Slidell to pay Mexico five 
million dollars on top of any indemnities they may claim in exchange for the border being drawn 
along New Mexico’s western edge northward to the 42nd parallel. If Mexico refused this offer, 
Slidell was instructed to offer forgiving the indemnities claimed by the U.S. in exchange for the 
full territory claimed by Texas in New Mexico. The section on New Mexico ends with Buchanan 
remarking that it was “scarcely to be supposed … that Mexico would relinquish five millions of 
dollars[sic] for the sake of retaining the narrow strip of territory…west of the Rio Grande.”79 
With “there is another subject of vast importance…Great Britain and France have designs 
upon California,” the official instructions began the next topic of negotiations. After repeating 
the U.S. stance on California from the October 17th, 1845 letter to Thomas Larkin, Secretary 
Buchanan instructed John Slidell to “ascertain whether Mexico has any intention of ceding it” to 
either of them. Slidell was carefully warned to do everything in his power to prevent any such 
Mexican cession if one was discovered, and it was recommended that he contact Thomas Larkin 
as well. Of course, all this was to be strictly secret and kept from “fall[ing] into improper 
hands.”80  
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That is where the similarities to the October 17th Larkin letter ended, and the following 
passage made bare the true ambitions and intentions of the U.S. federal government in the 
American Southwest. Buchanan’s façade of friendly hopefulness in equal sister republics rapidly 
crumbled as he added to Slidell’s instructions: 
 
The possession of the Bay and harbor of San Francisco is all important to the United 
States. The advantages to us of its acquisition are so striking, that it would be a waste of 
time to enumerate them here. If all these should be turned against our country, by the 
cession of California to Great Britain, our principal commercial rival, the consequences 
would be most disastrous. The Government of California is now but nominally dependent 
on Mexico; and it is more than doubtful whether her authority will ever be reinstated. 
Under these circumstances, it is the desire of the President that you shall use your best 
efforts to obtain a cession of that Province from Mexico to the United States. […] Money 
would be no object when compared with the value of the acquisition. Still the attempt 
must be made with great prudence and caution, and in such a manner as not to alarm the 
jealousy of the Mexican Government. Should you, after sounding the Mexican authorities 
on the subject, discover a prospect of success, the President would not hesitate to give, in 
addition to the assumption of the just claims of our citizens on Mexico, twenty five 
millions [sic] of dollars for the cession. Should you deem it expedient, you are authorized 
to offer this sum for a boundary, running due West from the southern extremity of New 
Mexico to the Pacific ocean [sic], or from any other point on its western boundary, which 
would embrace Monterey [Monterey, California] within our limits. If Monterey cannot be 
obtained, you may, if necessary, in addition to the assumption of those claims, offer 
twenty millions [sic] of dollars for any boundary, commencing at any point on the 
western line of New Mexico, and running due West to the Pacific, so as to include the 
bay and harbor of San Francisco. The larger the territory South of this Bay, the better.81 
  
The final segment of Slidell’s negotiation directions was a sudden, significant shift away 
from all previously stated positions. The formal air of stiff friendliness was maintained all 
throughout, but following the revelation of U.S. ambitions in New Mexico and California, this 
attitude was clearly a mere formality, if not a purposeful concealment of intentions. 
Furthermore, the course of diplomacy between the United States and Mexico was 
staggering regardless of new pursuits of hidden agendas. Mexican independence was 
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purposefully unrecognized for years as a means of placating Spain while Secretary John Quincy 
Adams and Minister Luis Onis debated a treaty that would prove highly advantageous to the U.S. 
Once this was completed and Florida was American territory, Washington quickly extended 
recognition to Mexico and several other former Spanish colonies; in doing this, the power of one 
of America’s three primary New World rivals, France, Great Britain, and Spain, was 
significantly reduced.82 When Texas rebelled, the United States refused assistance to its new, 
nominal friend in quelling the border territory’s rebellion. Instead, the U.S. Army was deployed 
into Mexican territory without permission, where it occupied Nacogdoches.83 For a decade 
Congress refused to annex Texas despite its direct request to join the Union and Texas’ status as 
de facto independent and sovereign. This was done in spite of numerous attempts to acquire 
Texas from Mexico prior to the Texan Revolution as a land purchase.84  
Annexation was finally pursued only after the U.S. felt that future annexation attempts 
would quickly diminish in achievability, foreign missions in Texas were actively pursuing 
agendas detrimental to U.S. interests, the United States’ ability to claim annexation was not in 
contravention of international law had increased, and the U.S. had positioned itself such that it 
could annex Texas, New Mexico, and California simultaneously without guaranteeing a war.85 
This bore all the hallmarks of long-term planning and strategic positioning on a stage 
purposefully set to maximize chances of success and minimize culpability.86 The United States 
struck at a time of relative weakness from a position of relative strength, and it only revealed its 
cards when it defensibly could claim to have done no wrong in the process.87 According to 
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President Grant, “the occupation, separation, and annexation were, from the inception of the 
movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states 
might be formed for the American Union. …The fact is, annexationists wanted more territory 
than they could possibly lay claim to, as part of the new acquisition.”88 He later described the 
lands gained via the Mexican-American War as “an empire and of incalculable value,” and that, 
in the pursuit of procuring that empire, the U.S. conspired to “provoke a fight, but it was 
essential that Mexico commence it.”89 This is the art of empire-building, and the evidence for 
this only continued to gather as events moved forward. 
  
 Texas Annexed by act of Congress 
In the meantime, Great Britain, France, and Mexico remained engaged extensively in 
Texas in last-ditch efforts to block U.S. annexation. The English Chargé d'affaires in Texas, Sir 
Charles Elliot, was so publicly active in his efforts to keep Texas out of Union that he provided 
the U.S. an opening to enact “one of the grandest moral spectacles which has ever been presented 
to mankind” by completely concealing the equally active, ongoing American efforts to achieve 
annexation.90 The intended spectacle to be displayed was that, relative to the European powers at 
play in Texas, the United States would appear to avoid “even the least appearance of interference 
with the free action of the people of Texas.”91 Charles Elliot obtained terms from Mexico to be 
proposed to Texas in early summer, 1845 that offered Texas Mexican recognition of their 
independence and sovereignty on the condition that Texas remain independent of the United 
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States.92 It was further reported that, if the Texans were to refuse his offer, seven thousand 
Mexican soldiers were waiting across the Rio Grande to invade Texas, and Elliot was expected 
to begin sending their commander intelligence as soon as he knew he wouldn’t defeat 
annexation.93 
 Annexation moved forward despite the growing international opposition. On April 12th, 
1844, President Tyler’s efforts to reopen annexation negotiations concluded in a treaty with 
Texas for the latter’s annexation to the United States, but it would fail to be ratified in the 
Senate.94 March of the following year, Congress passed a two-part joint resolution for annexing 
Texas and sent it to the Texan government for consideration; the Texan government formed a 
convention to vote on the terms of annexation and if accepted, draft a constitution.95 The 
convention ratified annexation on July 4, 1845, and Texas was formally accepted into the Union 
as an equal state “by the act of our Congress of the twenty-ninth of December, 1845.”96 
 During the process of considering the proposed terms for annexation, threats from 
Mexico regarding Texas and independence versus annexation, such as those announced to Texas 
by English Charge d’affaires Charles Elliot, presented mounting tensions and worries for the 
security of Texans. Texas requested that the U.S. Army take occupancy of the State as soon as 
possible to provide for their defense while drafting a constitution and awaiting congressional 
approval of statehood. The Polk administration responded that they could not deploy the military 
into Texas until the terms of annexation had been formally accepted, making Texas official 
American territory.97 Immediately following the acceptance of the joint resolutions of 
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annexation, the U.S. Army entered Texas from Fort Jessup, Louisiana. A unit of dragoons rode 
overland to Corpus Christi to make a public show of presence, but the majority of the Army of 
Occupancy, under General Taylor, was transported there by ship through the Gulf of Mexico. 
The force, comprising over half of the entirety of the regular U.S. military, encamped outside 
Corpus Christi in August, 1845.98 Both the army and the navy were given explicit orders to 
restrict themselves to defensive positions and avoid any hint of aggressive intentions.99 
 The final, formal annexation of Texas did nothing to Mexican-American relations except 
exacerbate tensions in an already volatile situation; however, the maintenance of peace was still 
within practical reach for the two North American countries. To keep war at bay, diplomacy still 
needed to be reinstated as quickly and amicably as possible. W.S. Parrott’s mission to Mexico 
City had proven successful, and John Slidell was dispatched to the Mexican capital in November 
of 1845 as the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the head of the new American 
Legation to Mexico. His instructions on how to proceed in that city have already been detailed in 
part as they relate to California and New Mexico, but an equally striking task was also assigned 
to the new American Minister: demand Mexican payment of indemnities.100 This would finally 
lead to the eruption of armed conflict. 
 
 The Reopening of Diplomacy 
 As already mentioned above, the letter to John Slidell was written on November 10th, 
1845, and the process of formally uniting Texas and the United States was in its penultimate 
stage at that date. Indeed, Texas was already claimed by Washington as federal territory of the 
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United States at the time of this letter. The American Consul in Mexico City, John Black, had 
written Washington in October, reporting that the Mexican government had accepted Polk’s 
request of reopening diplomacy, and the government’s response was the tasks assigned to John 
Slidell. The letter detailing his new job and instructions in that capacity began by acknowledging 
the “present crisis of the relations between the two countries” and solemnly reminding him of the 
“vast importance” of the office he had been appointed to.101 His general task was to “counteract 
the influence of foreign powers” and “restore those ancient relations of peace and good will 
which formerly existed” with Mexico.102 Before getting into specifics, Buchanan wrote for a 
while on the history of American relations with Mexico. He mentioned the “early and decided 
stand which the people of the United States and their Government” made in favor of the 
independence of former Spanish colonies in the Americas, and he claimed that this had earned 
America their goodwill.103 However well these former colonies viewed the United States in their 
infancy, the Mexican people’s sympathies had “since [been] estranged from us” as a result of 
“unfortunate events.”104 Buchanan’s point in that paragraph was to tell Slidell that the people of 
Mexico “ought to feel assured that their prosperity is our prosperity,” and that “we cannot but 
have the strongest desire to see them elevated, under a free, stable, and Republican Government, 
to a high rank among the nations of the earth.”105  
He then spent another lengthy paragraph comparing the “peculiar” and “free forms” of 
government enjoyed by North and South Americans to the “monarchical institutions of 
Europe.”106 He suggested that the free republics of the Americas should form an “American 
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system of policy” centered around keeping Europe and European colonies out of the two 
American continents.107 To this end, Slidell was clearly instructed to firmly refuse any offers of 
mediation on the part of any European power. Secretary Buchanan asserted, “The United States 
will never afford, by their conduct, the slightest pretext for any interference from that quarter in 
American concerns. Separated as we are from the old world…the march of free Government on 
this continent must not be trammelled[sic] by…European powers.”108 As the Secretary went on, 
his words became increasingly reminiscent of imperial spheres of influence then being 
established in Asia by European empires. This rhetoric continued for a short, third paragraph that 
only increased in intensity.  Buchanan claimed that attempts to exert influence or establish 
colonies in the New World would inevitably end in failure as the “expansive energy of free 
institutions” spread to the colonists, and revolution would turn attempted colonies into more 
“free and independent States.”109 
After casually positing that the United States had only the best intentions for the welfare 
of Mexico and indirectly presenting an American sphere of influence as a sort of community 
service, Secretary Buchanan outlined Slidell’s first specific task: 
 
The first subject which will demand your attention is, the claims of our citizens on 
Mexico. It would be useless here to trace the history of these claims and the outrages 
from which they spring. The archives of your Legation will furnish all the necessary 
information on this subject. The history of no civilized nation presents, in so short a 
period of time, so many wanton attacks upon the rights of persons and property as have 
been endured by the citizens of the United States from the Mexican authorities. These 
never would have been tolerated by the United States from any nation on the face of the 
earth, except a neighbouring and sister Republic. President Jackson, in his message to the 
Senate, of the 7th February, 1837, uses the following language with great justice and 
truth: “The length of time since some of these injuries have been committed, the repeated 
and unavailing applications for redress, the wanton character of some of the outrages 
upon the property and persons of our citizens, upon the officers and flag of the United 
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States, independent of recent insults to this Government and people by the late 
Extraordinary Mexican Minister, would justify, in the eyes of all nations, immediate 
war.” Still, he was unwilling to resort to this last extremity, without “giving to Mexico 
one more opportunity to atone for the past, before we take redress into our own hands.” 
Accordingly, he recommended, “that an Act be passed, authorizing reprisals, and the use 
of the naval force of the United States by the Executive against Mexico, to enforce them, 
in the event of a refusal by the Mexican Government to come to an amicable adjustment 
of the matters in controversy between us, upon another demand thereof, made from on 
board one of our vessels of war on the coast of Mexico.”110 
 
The talk of the alleged indemnities, outrages, and repeated refusals to pay went on for pages and 
would comprise a third of the entire letter.111  
 After this extensive and colorful review of the seemingly unending Mexican 
depredations, Secretary Buchanan charged Slidell “in a prudent and friendly spirit, to impress the 
Mexican Government with a sense of their injustice towards the United States, as well as of the 
patient forbearance which has been exercised by us.”112 He insisted that the patience exercised in 
this regard could not be continued much longer, and the claims “must now speedily be adjusted 
in a satisfactory manner.”113 The Secretary immediately acknowledged the impossibility of 
Slidell’s task by asking, “But in what manner can this duty be performed consistently with the 
amicable spirit of your mission?”114 To this point in the letter, the annexation of Texas had not 
been acknowledged at all, but the purpose behind that lack of acknowledgement was obvious. It 
was to be maintained that the United States had done no wrong in annexing Texas, and the 
Mexican claims of American-inflicted injury in the loss of Texas were groundless. Such an 
approach was wholly inconsistent with the claimed desire for continuing peace between friendly 
and equal sister republics. 
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 “The fact is but too well known to the world,” Buchanan continued his letter, “that the 
Mexican Government are not now in a condition to satisfy these claims by the payment of 
money.”115 The solution to this impossible situation, as told to Minister Slidell by Buchanan, was 
to be found in the annexation of Texas: “This question of boundary may, therefore, be adjusted 
in such a manner between the two Republics, as to cast the burden of the debt due to American 
claimants upon their own Government, whilst it will do no injury to Mexico.”116 He then 
reviewed the history of ownership over the lands now claimed by Texas, concluding that there 
absolutely could not exist “any very serious doubt” of the U.S. claim’s validity.117 Before the 
conversation moved on, Slidell was given explicit orders regarding negotiations over the Texan 
border: “The independence of Texas must be considered a settled fact, and is not to be called into 
question.”118 
 From there, the letter entered into the section on negotiating the cession of New Mexico 
and California, as already discussed above. Briefly summarized, the maximum offers Slidell was 
authorized to make were dependent upon the degree of territory Mexico would willingly part 
with. In exchange for the full territory claimed by Texas, the United States would forgive 
Mexico’s debts. If Mexico was willing to part with New Mexico, they would receive up to an 
additional five million dollars after the forgiving of their debts. If Mexico was willing to part 
with California and Slidell can learn of that willingness without revealing America’s ambitions 
to have it, he was allowed, “without hesitation,” to offer an additional twenty-five million on top 
of the forgiving of Mexican debts.119  
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 Before this lengthy and telling letter to John Slidell finally concluded, Secretary 
Buchanan raised a final point regarding the profound implications of this mission’s success or 
failure, and the difficulty he would encounter in his efforts in Mexico City: 
 
Your mission is one of the most delicate and important which has ever been confided to a 
citizen of the United States. The people to whom you will be sent are proverbially 
jealous, and they have been irritated against the United States by recent events and the 
intrigues of foreign Powers. To conciliate their good will is indispensable to your 
success. I need not warn you against wounding their national vanity. You may probably 
have to endure their unjust reproaches with equanimity. It would be difficult to raise a 
point of honor between the United States and so feeble and degraded a Power as Mexico. 
This reflection will teach you to bear and forbear much for the sake of accomplishing the 
great objects of your mission. We are sincerely desirous to be on good terms with 
Mexico, and the President reposes implicit confidence in your patriotism, sagacity, and 
ability to restore the ancient relations of friendship between the two Republics.120 
 
 One month and a week later, Secretary Buchanan wrote another letter to Slidell updating 
his instructions. The authority to forgive all debts owed the United States by Mexico was 
restricted to all debts preceding 1839 or included within “the provisions of the unratified 
Convention of 20 November, 1843, had they arisen prior to its date.”121 Any debts claimed by 
Mexico that had not been diplomatically recognized by an official commission on indemnities as 
well as any debts incurred following the most recent commission’s conclusion were not to be 
included. To help offset this new restriction and increase Slidell’s persuasiveness in general, a 
sum of six million dollars had been made newly available for immediate withdrawal upon the 
completion of a treaty along the guidelines previously set out in the November letter’s 
instructions. 
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 In late January, a third set of instructions was mailed to John Slidell pertaining to the 
criteria under which he should demand his passports and terminate his mission in Mexico. If the 
Mexican government refused to receive him, there would be nothing left to do “but to take the 
redress of the wrongs of [our] citizens into [our] own hands.”122 The ultimate decision upon how 
to proceed in that situation was left up to him, but he was told to behave and speak in such a way 
that cast the blame of diplomacy’s failure on Mexico. After warning Mexico of the “inevitable 
consequences” of their refusal to receive him, he was to announce that he would be staying in 
Mexico City until Washington sent updated instructions.123 Furthermore, if a revolution replaced 
the government there or “a change in ministry” happened, he was to “ascertain the views and 
wishes of the new Government or administration.”124 The impetus for these new instructions was 
then addressed directly: 
  
 It would seem to be the desire of the Mexican Government to evade the redress of the 
real injuries of our citizens by confirming the negotiations to the adjustment of a pecuniary 
indemnity for its imaginary rights over Texas. This cannot be tolerated. The two subjects must 
proceed hand in hand. They can never be separated. It is evidently with the view of thus limiting 
the negotiation, that the Mexican authorities have been quibbling about the form of your 
credentials; without ever asking whether you had instructions and full powers to adjust the Texan 
boundary. The advice of the Council of Government seems to have been dictated by the same 
spirit. They do not advise the Mexican Government to refuse to receive you; but, assuming the 
fact that the government had agreed to receive a Plenipotentiary to treat upon the subject of 
Texas alone, they infer that it is not bound to receive an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary without this limitation. In the mean time the President, in anticipation of the final 
refusal of the Mexican Government to receive you, has ordered the army of Texas to advance to 
take position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, and has directed that a strong fleet shall be 
immediately assembled in the Gulph [sic] of Mexico.125 
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By this point in the course of events, Mexican-American relations had begun a trend of 
deterioration that would continue unabated until the two nations were at war. The administration 
of President Herrera had accepted President Polk’s overtures and begun the resumption of 
diplomacy, but between the time of that acceptance and the arrival of John Slidell in Mexico 
City, domestic Mexican forces of public opinion had turned against Herrera so vehemently that 
he was forced to stall Slidell from beginning negotiations. General Paredes staged an insurrection 
against Herrera and seized the federal government of Mexico.126 Instructions as to how to 
proceed in such an event had already been sent by letter on January 20th, but Secretary Buchanan 
repeated these instructions in greater detail upon learning of Paredes’ coup: 
 
The President is sincerely desirous to preserve peace with Mexico. Both inclination and 
policy dictate this course. Should the Mexican Government, however, finally refuse to receive 
you, the cup of forbearance will then have been exhausted. […] In view of this serious 
alternative, every honorable effort should be made before a final rupture. You should wait 
patiently for a final decision on the question of your reception, unless it should be unreasonably 
protracted or you should clearly discover that they are trifling with this Government. […] Much 
must necessarily be left to your own discretion. In general terms, I may say, that you should take 
care to act with such prudence and firmness that it may appear manifest to the people of the 
United States and to the world that a rupture could not be honorably avoided. […] In addition to 
the naval force already in the Gulph [sic], the Frigates Cumberland, Potomac, and Raritan have 
been ordered to rendezvous before Vera Cruz as speedily as possible. Should war become 
inevitable, the President will be prepared to conduct it with vigor. […] Your request for 
instructions relative to the mortgage stipulations entered into by the Government of Mexico with 
their foreign creditors on the proceeds of the public lands in California, New Mexico, 
Chihuahua, Senora, and Tamaulipas, presents a subject of considerable difficulty. To attempt, 
however, to obtain the previous consent of these creditors, would be almost certainly to defeat 
your negotiation. I can devise no other mode of obviating this difficulty than that of withholding 
for their benefit the payment of a part of the stipulated sum until their release can be obtained, 
should Mexico agree to such a stipulation in the Treaty. […] If no other alternative remains but 
either to fail in the negotiation or to accept such a title as Mexico can convey, then conclude the 
treaty upon the terms authorized by your original instructions, without reference to the alleged 
mortgage. In that event, we must leave for future arrangement the claims, if any such justly exist, 
of the foreign creditors of Mexico. A great measure of public policy must not be defeated by an 
attempt previously to adjust the pecuniary claims of these creditors.127 
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The Paredes government sharply refused to receive Slidell, and Slidell demanded his 
passports. In response, General Taylor was ordered to move south to edge of the claimed 
American territory, where he set up a fortified camp along the Rio Grande opposite Matamoros. 
The Mexican garrison in Matamoros sent him two messages before the opening engagement of 
the Mexican-American War; the second message was simply a notification that hostilities had 
begun. Polk’s administration had successfully provoked Mexico into initiating contact, and he 
requested that Congress declare war: “But now, after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the 
boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the 
American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are 
now at war. As war exists, and notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of 
Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate 
with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country.”128 Congress voted, and two 
days later, on May 13, 1846, President Polk issued a proclamation of a congressional declaration 
of war: “By the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government 
and the United States.”129 
 
Was it Imperialism? 
Albert Gallatin wrote that it is important to bear in mind that the indemnities themselves 
were not the cause of war. He argued that the annexation of Texas was “tantamount to a 
declaration of war against Mexico,” on the grounds that Mexico was formally at war with Texas 
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at the time of annexation.130 The relative weakness of Mexico kept this from being the result of 
annexation: “Mexico, sensible of her weakness, declined war.”131 Gallatin described this 
sequence of events as intentionally planned by the proponents of annexation, and the above 
review of the contemporary documents is consistent with his analysis. From these documents, it 
appears that the leaders of the United States were genuinely interested in avoiding war as long as 
possible, if not entirely; however, the preference of avoiding war was clearly not strong enough 
to override the territorial ambitions harbored by the same leaders. Rather, the preference for 
peace was, at least in part, a cover for keeping the price of expansion as low as possible. 
Was that enough to constitute imperialism? Did the United States unilaterally provoke 
military action, use either military or compelling influence to impose state interests on foreign 
powers using relative power advantages, actively seek to increase its resources and territories 
without regard for foreign sovereignty, or employ racism as either a justification for actions or 
means of centralizing authority? Was the sequence of events examined coincidental or 
deliberately strategized? 
The relevance of the first category – the unilateral provocation of military action – is self-
evident. Despite efforts to avoid war, whether sincere or feigned, the commencement of hostile 
activity was provoked by an indefatigable pursuit of U.S. interests by the Polk administration 
that, despite being driven in part by opposing interests, refused to publicly acknowledge rival 
claims, their validity, or opposing interests. There was extensive allusion to foreign interference 
during the 1844-1846 period, but this phrase was either privately used in government 
correspondence or, when used in public proclamations, cast in such a light that implied the U.S. 
had the moral high ground. The latter use, while recognizing foreign interests and claims, only 
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tangentially acknowledged their presence as a threat, and the presence of fellow states’ interests 
was never approached as a multilateral situation with potential multilateral solutions. Indeed, 
specific instructions were meted out to accept foreign mediation under no circumstances. Texas, 
California, and New Mexico were approached unilaterally solely according to the interests of the 
United States; this process provoked the Mexican-American War. 
The use relative power advantages in exerting either influence or military strength in 
attempt to compel foreign compliance with American interests is observable with both Spain and 
Mexico in 1810-1821 and 1844-1846, respectively. General Jackson’s incursions into Spanish 
Florida during the Seminole Wars were in full violation of Spanish sovereignty, and they 
coincided with contemporary revolutions in Spanish America. His expeditions there were 
domestically authorized by legislation allowing for the seizure of West Florida and in the event 
of Spanish loss of control, military deployment into East Florida. The passage of this legislation 
came at the tail-end of the Napoleonic Wars. As the Adams-Onis Treaty neared completion, 
American recognition of former Spanish colonies as independent was withheld in the interest of 
finalizing the treaty, which ceded Florida to the United States. Spain was in no position to back 
out of the treaty. American military assets already occupied West Florida and had recently 
demonstrated the capacity to conquer East Florida; in exchange for the peaceful transfer for 
Spanish Florida to the U.S., Washington was dropping rival claims to Spanish borderlands in the 
west. Rebellions throughout the rest of Spanish America were taxing Madrid’s strength, and the 
conflict with the U.S. that would result from refusing to ratify the treaty was likely to add the 
United States to Spain’s New World enemies’ number. Spain was cornered, and the U.S. exerted 
its relative superior strength to great effect. 
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Mexico felt the pressure of American influence in Texas early on. The U.S. Army 
occupied Nacogdoches during the Texan Revolution, and the U.S. Navy briefly occupied 
Monterey in the final weeks leading up to the Mexican-American War.132 Substantial American 
military assets were stationed along the Sabine River at the Louisiana-Texas border waiting for 
the annexation of Texas as a federal territory, and they promptly entered Texas once that was 
officially done. After annexing Texas without regard for Mexico’s valid rivaling claims, the Polk 
administration’s plan was to press Mexico’s economic weakness for greater territorial 
concessions, and if Mexico refused, the U.S. would demand immediate payment of outstanding 
debts sourced from Mexican indemnities. If Mexico refused to settle these debts, the U.S. 
military would extract payment forcibly. Washington knew of Mexico’s financial inability to pay 
off the debts, so they would accept the rest of Mexico’s northern territory as recompense. The 
third category, the active pursuit of expansion at foreign expense, is equally observable in the 
coercive diplomacy and high demands foisted on Mexico, and this is reinforced by observing 
that the same territorial demands were made “a sine qua non of any treaty” during the Mexican-
American War.133 
Racism played a moderately active role in the pursuit of the formal transfer of 
sovereignty over the Southwest, where it was made most evident in occasional statements made 
in defense of annexing either Texas or the entire Southwest. An excellent example of one such 
statement was given by Buchanan in an 1844 speech: “It is utterly impossible that a nation 
chiefly composed of native-born Americans, who carry with them all the principles and 
safeguards of political liberty, can ever remain citizens of Mexico, where all these blessings are 
practically unknown. Besides, in the very nature of things, our race of men can never be 
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subjected to the imbecile and indolent Mexican race.”134 This is the civilizing mission rationale 
for expansion, but it was not as heavily applied to Texas and Mexico in the 1840s as it would be 
later in the century in the Philippines by Americans or in Africa by European empires. 
Nonetheless, it was present among the aspects of the continental U.S. expansion. 
The growth of American borders in the first half of the nineteenth century bore the same 
hallmarks of imperialism used in the identification processes applied to the United States in the 
late 1890s. The exact manner in which each specific identifying quality manifested itself during 
this period of expansion by sale, intimidation, and conquest may have varied both throughout the 
1803-1848 period as well as from the 1898 expansion overseas, but the central characteristics of 
each imperial quality reappeared faithfully across both. The final descent into war was finally 
made inevitable when the United States made high demands of Mexico using coinciding 
Mexican debts and economic weakness to limit Mexico’s response options. Either Mexico would 
surrender half its territory or be forced to keep it from being taken as payment of debts. By the 
annexation of this territory, the United States secured to itself a global monopoly on cotton, a 
vast, long-lasting market for its industrial goods, the ability to more easily access additional such 
markets across the Pacific Ocean, and denied these things to rival empires. This was the process 
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